Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ECIS 2007 Proceedings

European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS)

2007

The Enterprise Interoperability Center - An
Institutional Framework Facilitating Enterprise
Interoperability
P. Frenzel
SAP AG

C. Schroth
SAP Research CEC St. Gallen

T. Samsonow
SAP Research

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2007
Recommended Citation
Frenzel, P.; Schroth, C.; and Samsonow, T., "The Enterprise Interoperability Center - An Institutional Framework Facilitating
Enterprise Interoperability" (2007). ECIS 2007 Proceedings. 30.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2007/30

This material is brought to you by the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ECIS 2007 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

THE ENTERPRISE INTEROPERABILITY CENTER – AN
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FACILITATING
ENTERPRISE INTEROPERABILITY
Petra Frenzel, SAP AG, Walldorf, Germany
Christoph Schroth, University of St. Gallen, Institute for Media and Communications
Management and SAP Research CEC St. Gallen, Switzerland
Tatjana Samsonowa, SAP Research, Research Portfolio Office, Germany

Abstract
During the last years, electronic collaboration between enterprises has significantly increased. To
seamlessly integrate applications across company boundaries, all stakeholders have to adhere to
common standards. Currently, cross-organizational business relationships are setup based on a
plethora of standards that involve different technical representations, semantics, process
specifications and also vary with respect to scope and granularity. The resulting business standards
dilemma prevents corporations from seamlessly cooperating with each other. State-of-the-art
standards tackle parts of this interoperability issue by providing flexible and semantically more
precise specifications, but have not yet been widely adopted. The abundance of different standards,
but also the frequently divergent interests of stakeholders involved in the development and adoption of
standards prevents enterprises from seamlessly interconnecting their applications. In this work, we
leverage institutional economics to elaborate on a novel approach to facilitating enterprise
interoperability. Not the creation of yet another standard, but the establishment and fostering of a
proper institutional framework will significantly reduce the stakeholders’ uncertainty in deciding for
and adopting a standard and thus drive seamless cross-organizational interoperability. A key outcome
of the ATHENA-project, the Enterprise Interoperability Center (EIC) is expected to provide such an
institutional framework. This work is devoted to analyzing this center on the basis of institutional
economics in order to derive essential recommendations for it to emerge as the prevailing reference
point for e-Business standards and to thus accelerate the seamless and efficient electronic
collaboration between enterprises.
Keywords: Enterprise Interoperability, Innovation Diffusion, Cross-organizational Business
Collaboration, Enterprise Interoperability Center, EIC, Institutional Economics, Institutions,
Institutional Change, e-Business Standards, Development and Adoption of Standards
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1

INTRODUCTION

During the last years, electronic collaboration among enterprises has significantly increased (Ruggaber
2005, European Commission 2005). Companies that adopt e-Business solutions may capitalize from
reduced operating costs and improved gains, increased customer satisfaction and retention, faster and
more efficient internal processes, improved supply chain integration, and technological advancements
(Hoyer 2006, Malone 2001, Porter 2001). To seamlessly integrate applications across company
boundaries and to thus realize networked organizations, all stakeholders have to adhere to common
protocols, processes and document standards. As described in (Stuhec 2005), cross-organizational
value chains are currently being established on the basis of long-term cooperation contracts and
Service-level Agreements (SLAs). Such agreements are often setup on the basis of a wide variety of
existing industry standards that involve different technical representations, semantics and process
specifications. Frequently, additional proprietary adaptations are applied to those standards in order to
meet individual business requirements which lead to a business standards dilemma (Stuhec 2005,
Chau 2001) and business collaborations tend to become unmanageable and hardly changeable and
prevent corporations from seamlessly collaborating with each other. A further drawback of the
majority of existing standards for performing electronic business transactions is the lack of semantic
integration. Different perceptions of the same piece of information in different systems and
applications have not been addressed by most existing e-Business standards and represent considerable
"silo walls" (Sippl 2006) that need to be taken down on the way to true enterprise application
interoperability. State-of-the-art standards such as RosettaNet (Sundaram 2001) are more precise with
regard to the definition of both business data and processes and also allow for more flexibility, but
have not yet been widely adopted. Not the creation of yet another e-Business standard, but the joint
agreement and implementation of an adequate standard among a critical mass of companies will foster
enterprise interoperability.
The Enterprise Interoperability Centre (EIC) has been established in April 2006 as a non-profit
organization by the EU project “ATHENA” 1 under the FP6 Information Society Technologies (IST)
Programme which addresses the key challenges inherent to enterprise interoperability. Its major goal is
to address the above mentioned challenges by establishing, promoting and providing a hub for debate
on interoperability issues and to act as a provider of commonly accepted rule sets for implementing
cross-organizational electronic interconnections. Instead of defining yet another messaging standard,
the EIC follows a consensus-driven approach that aims at providing users a platform to jointly create
reference business processes and documents that work as templates for the setup of crossorganizational business collaborations.
In this work, we leverage institutional economics as a theoretical groundwork to elaborate on this
center which can be considered as institutional framework rather than a conventional organization.
The EIC differs from classical organizations as it is an abstract entity that does not act in a wealthmaximizing fashion while adhering to pre-determined constraints, but rather prescribes formal
constraints itself. We derive essential recommendations for this center on how to reduce uncertainties
involved in electronic interaction of enterprises and to sustainably prevail among the different already
existing institutions. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter two presents the
challenges inherent to cross-organizational business collaboration and elaborates on the major classes
of stakeholders involved in the development and adoption of related standards. In Chapter three, we
introduce the “new” institutional economics as published by North (North 1990) as the research
approach which underlies this work. Chapter four presents the EIC as a novel, institutional approach to
facilitating enterprise interoperability and also provides recommendations for this institution on how to
operate as effectively as possible. Chapter five concludes the work with a brief summary.
1

http://www.athena-ip.org/
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2

CHALLENGES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL ENTERPRISE
INTEROPERABILITY

Despite the rapid emergence of new technologies, application interoperability remains an unreached
goal for numerous companies. However, on-demand and short-term product development, increasing
global competition and highly dynamic corporate structures foster the need for companies to be able to
quickly and efficiently setup seamless cross-organizational supply chains. Such inter-company
business processes in many industries have become complex, involving multiple tiers of globally
distributed companies that usually adhere to a multitude of different e-Business standards. The
agreement on a commonly used standard that provides a basis for setting up such business processes
and defines the structure and semantics of the exchanged business documents is a crucial prerequisite
for seamless enterprise interoperability. The Boston-based Yankee Group (Yankee Group 2006)
performed a survey among enterprises about their use of business-to-business (B2B) standards, and 26
percent of respondents cited there were too many vertical industry-specific standards as the secondlargest impediment - after cost - to the adoption of B2B standards. The lack of commonly accepted
inter-company processes and the inconsistent implementation of standards prevent from seamless m:n
connectivity and increase the effort for setting up electronic collaboration in particular with a larger
number of partners. Often, bilateral and thus proprietary agreements on the details of a cross-company
business process prevail, leading to a rising number and complexity of electronic business
relationships.

Figure 1: Development of inter-organizational standards (Löwer 2006)
The involvement of different stakeholders who pursue potentially different goals in the development
and adoption of inter-organizational standards as depicted in Figure 1 represents a further major
barrier to standards adoption. User Firms represent the first stakeholder: They are supposed to
implement the standards in order to connect their applications across company boundaries. Depending
on the alignment of user interests and the expected benefits from participation in standardization
efforts, their strategy may be to drive, to only observe, to adopt or to even contribute to a standard
(Löwer 2006). Users might decide to play a merely observing role in case the involved Standards
Development Organization (SDO) does not cover “the industry of the firm in question, just as CIDX
targets the chemical industry, but not the requirements of the related pharmaceutical industry...If the
firm expects the costs of actively changing the situation to be higher than its benefits, it will decide
only to observe the existing SDO’s activities, while using proprietary solutions for its IO
relationships.”(Löwer 2006, p. 220) In case several users decide to only observe the development of a
standard, its universal validity and applicability will be limited and only few players may benefit from
a common solution to some extent. SDOs build a highly interwoven mesh of competing players who
pursue partially overlapping activities: According to (Löwer 2006), they may coordinate the
development of a new specification, participate in other SDOs or promote the adoption of its
specifications. SDOs currently suffer from the lack of a clear coordination of the relationships and
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fields of responsibility between them. Also, a “reasonable intellectual property rights policy is a
critical factor for an SDO’s success. If contributors have to transfer all the rights of their contributions
or can even be sued for damages caused by their specification, the motivation to participate will be
very low.” (Löwer 2006, p. 226) Software vendors are part of this game as they are supposed to
incorporate the standards into the solutions they sell to the end-users. As opposed to users who only
need to consider certain industry-specific SDOs, such vendors have to cope with the almost
unmanageable variety of different SDOs, which are active in very different specification fields.
“Especially large vendors that cover almost any industry should systematically decide on their
participation in different SDOs” (Löwer 2006, p. 229). Again, depending on the alignment of interests
and the benefit of participation, software vendors may take over an observing, an adopting, a
contributing or a driving role. Last, governmental organizations also impact the development of IO
specifications as they can impose specifications as norms to enforce their acceptance, support SDOs to
lower costs of the standards development and coordinate the different SDOs’ work to prevent
collusion between them. As they frequently pursue their very own interests and aim at developing or
driving standards that match their specific requirements (e.g. for public procurement purposes), they
act similar to the user firms described above.
Summing up, the high number of partly overlapping standards of different scope and granularity as
well as the complex interrelationship between stakeholders involved in the development and adoption
of e-Business standards prevents users from seamlessly interconnecting their enterprise systems. An
agile intermediary framework which facilitates the adoption of existing standards, mediates between
the different stakeholders and incorporates incentives for all of them to actively engage is now
required. As mentioned above, an important factor decelerating the adoption of a common e-Business
standard is the fear of a standard not to become widely accepted. Therefore, a coordinating entity is
needed that acts as a trustable standardization reference point which consequently follows the goal to
reduce uncertainty involved in the development and adoption of e-Business standards.

3

RESEARCH APPROACH: INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

This section is devoted to introducing institutional economics as an underlying framework for
understanding the emergence, characteristics as well as the change of institutions. In chapter four, we
will apply this theory in a practical case and argue that the EIC can be regarded as an institution.
Finally, we try to derive implications of this classification as an institution on how the EIC should be
positioned and operated in order to prevail among the different already existing institutional rule sets
and to optimize the reduction of transaction costs among users firms.
First of all, it must be conceded that “institutionalism lacks a systematic core theory” (Hodgson 1998,
p. 174). There are numerous approaches to the institutional phenomenon existing whose initiators have
failed to agree on a consistent set of theoretical building blocks. In this work, we decided to leverage
the highly influential “new” institutionalists such as North (North 1990), Posner (Posner 1973),
Schotter (Schotter 1981) and Williamson (Williamson 1975). In (Hodgson 1998), Hodgson provides
an excellent overview of the historical development: He sketches how institutional economists proceed
in practice, defines and elaborates the core concepts of habits and institutions, as rooted in the early
institutionalist theory of Veblen and Commons, elaborates on the new institutionalist vein, and
presents real-world cases where individual agents need to rely on constraints. “Not only are habits and
rules ubiquitous, but we are typically required to rely on them whether or not (bounded) optimization
is possible” (Hodgson 1998, p.168). The emergence and the characteristics of institutions represent a
cornerstone of institutional economics and shall be presented in the following paragraph. Due his
outstanding influence in this scientific field of activity, we adhere to North’s (North 1990) approach
which relies on two major facts which lead to the establishment of institutions:
The individual agents’ spectrum of motivations and their inability to comprehensively decipher the
environment lead to uncertainties in their mutual interaction as they cannot be considered as fully
rational individuals. Second, transaction costs for measurement and enforcement represent significant
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hurdles to efficient interaction. “To explore the deficiencies of the rational choice approach, both the
individual agents’ motivation and their ability to deciphering the environment must be investigated”
(North 1990, p. 20). North elaborates on the human motivation and argues that individuals do not
merely aim at maximizing wealth and utility, but also frequently show “altruism and self-imposed
constraints, which radically change the outcomes with respect to the choices that people actually
make” (North 1990, p.20) Uncertainties in the interaction of individual agents also arise from the
agents’ computational limitations which are determined by the “capacity of the mind to process,
organize, and utilize information.“ (North 1990, p. 25) “In practice, individual agents cannot be a
“lightning calculator”, quickly, effortlessly, and inexplicably finding the optimum just as we can
readily locate the lowest point of a U-curve in a simple textbook diagram. Even with given and
unambiguous information, complex optimization problems typically involve difficulties not only of
specification but of computability.” (Hodgson 1998, p. 187) Decision-making in the context of
complexity or uncertainty requires individuals to rely on relatively simple procedures and decisionrules which structure the interaction of agents and limit their choice sets (Simon 1957). On the one
hand, North’s theory of institutions is constructed from a theory of individual agents’ behaviour which
focuses on individual motivation and on the inability of the individual to comprehensively and
objectively decipher the environment. On the other hand, it builds upon a transaction cost theory of
exchange. North quotes the costs that incur when measuring the value of exchanged goods as well as
enforcement costs as major components constituting transaction costs. “Commodities, services, and
the performance of agents have numerous attributes and their levels vary from one specimen or agent
to another. The measurement of these levels is too costly to be comprehensive or fully accurate.”
(North 1990, p. 29) Information asymmetries increase the uncertainty involved in measuring the value
of exchanged goods or services. Enforcement costs incur for monitoring and metering the various
attributes that represent the performance of agents and thus contribute to transaction costs as well.
As a consequence of the uncertainties involved in the interaction of individual agents (due to the
unpredictable behaviour, the inability to comprehensively and objectively decipher the environment as
well as the resulting high transaction costs), rules and structuring frameworks evolve which North
refers to as institutions. Institutions represent the structure for interaction between agents that in turn
determines the cost of transaction and thus also impacts an economy’s efficiency. “How well
institutions solve the problems of coordination…is determined by the motivation of the players (their
utility function), the complexity of the environment, and the ability of the players to decipher and
order the environment (measurement and enforcement).” (North 1990, p. 34)
After elaborating on reasons for institutions to emerge, their core characteristics shall be presented.
Many definitions of institutions exist: Schotter (Schotter 1981, p. 11) considers them as “general
regularities in social behavior”, while North (North 1990, p. 3) regards them as “the rules of the game
in society or…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” We have identified
some core characteristics of institutions which are common to most of the highly influential theories:
First, they involve the interaction of agents and provide them with information. They are nonpurposeful, frequently abstract entities (“the rules of the game” (North 1990)), which are created and
changed by the individual agents. Despite of the possibility to change, they mostly sustain, and are
sustained by, shared conceptions and expectations and have self-reinforcing and persistent qualities.
The values incorporated are supposed to play a normative role and exist in the form of informal or
formal constraints that need to be enforced to be effective. The action-information loop depicted in
Figure 2 shows the interdependent relationship between agents and institutions. Individual agents
require an institutional framework to reduce manifold uncertainties (such as those induced by
individual motivation and limited capacity for deciphering the environment), and institutions provide
information and direction to individual interaction.
It must be stressed that institutions are different from organizations: “A crucial distinction…is made
between institutions and organizations. Like institutions, organizations provide a structure to human
interaction…Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. The
purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of the team within that
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set of rules is to win the game – by a combination of skills, strategy, and coordination…Organizations
are created with purposive intent in consequence of the opportunity set resulting from the existing set
of constraints…and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are major agents of
institutional change.” (North 1990, p.5)

Figure 2: Action- Information loop of institutional economics
According to North, institutions can be realized in the form of informal constraints or formal rules.
“In our daily interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social relations, or in
business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of
behaviour, and conventions.” (North 1990, p. 36) These informal constraints help to reduce the
complexity and uncertainty in the interaction of agents. “The difference between informal and formal
constraints is one of degree…Formal rules can complement and increase the effectiveness of informal
constraints. They may lower information, monitoring, and enforcement costs and hence make informal
constraints possible solutions to more complex exchange.” (North 1990, p.46) North thereby envisions
a “continuum from taboos, customs, and traditions at one end to written constitutions at the other” and
differentiates between political/ judicial rules, economic rules and contracts.
One further important point is the incentive structure of institutions which heavily impacts the
direction of knowledge and skills that agents will build up and thus may influence the success of
whole industries. Individuals and organizations are considered “purposive entities designed by their
creators to maximize wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the
institutional structure of the society.” (North 1990, p.73) North argues that “the institutional
framework will shape the direction of the acquisition of knowledge and skills and that direction will be
the decisive factor for the long-run development of that society…If the firm or other economic
organization invests in knowledge that increases the productivity of the physical or human capital
inputs or improves the tacit knowledge of the entrepreneurs, then the resultant productivity increase is
also consistent with the growth of the economy. But what if maximizing behavior by the firm consists
of burning down or sabotaging competitors…?”(North 1990, p.78).
After elaborating on the emergence and major characteristics of institutions as defined by North, we
briefly present agents, reasons and typical patterns of institutional change. As North states,
organizations “and their entrepreneurs engage in purposive activity and in that role are the agents of,

220

and shape the direction of, institutional change.” (North 1990, p.73) The individual agents respond to
incentives incorporated in the institutional framework. Fundamental changes of relative prices and
changes in individual taste are quoted as the two major triggers for institutional change. The above
mentioned wealth-maximizing behavior of firms can take the form of decision-making within the
existing set of constraints or of changing the constraints. Organizations may acquire the necessary
skills and knowledge to efficiently deal with an existing institutional framework. But an alternative is
to devote resources to changing the institutional constraints. Which direction the individual agent takes
depends upon its subjective perception of the payoffs. Individual agents compete to benefit from
opportunities existing under the given institutional structure. If organizations perceive that they have
better opportunities under a different set of rules (where the relative price of interacting is significantly
lower than in the existing one), then they will devote resources to changing rules in case they
recognize reasonable possibilities of success. As North states, in the modern U.S. economy, economic
organizations devote resources to both dealing with existing constraint frameworks and to modifying
them. As a case study, North (North 1990, p.84) argues that the shift from property rights in human
beings to property rights in land in the medieval Europe was a result of an increase in population and
in the scarcity of land which in turn increased the relative price of land. To change and enforce
property rights in land enabled the creators of this formal institution to securely invest into land and
subsequently benefit from the related rights. An important question that must be posed in this context
is: When do such relative price changes lead to institutional change and when are they simply a source
of re-contracting within the existing institutional framework? In the case of institutional equilibrium
(North 1990), where with regard to a given bargaining strength of the players and the set of contractual
bargains that constitute the total economic exchange, none of the stakeholders would consider it
advantageous to spend resources into restructuring the agreements and resulting constraints.
Institutional change is caused in case a “change in relative prices leads one or both to an exchange,
where it is political or economic, to perceive that either or both could do better with an altered
agreement or contract. An attempt will be made to renegotiate the contract. However, because
contracts are nested in a hierarchy of rules, the renegotiation may not be possible without restructuring
the higher set of rules (or violating some norm of behavior). In that case, the party that stands to
improve his or her bargaining position may very well attempt to devote resources to restructuring the
rules at a higher level.” (North 1990, p.86). As the break-up of slavery shows, not only the change of
relative prices may act as trigger of changed constraints. It was rather the intellectual power of the
antislavery movement per se (which North refers to as “taste”) which enabled and also forced the
politicians to act. In this particular case, the costs for changing constraints and rules were not too high
as the democratic political institutional framework allowed people to freely express their opinions
without having to fear any form of repression.
Institutional change has been proved to be slow and incremental in most cases. Only wars,
revolutions or natural disasters may trigger disruptive changes. “The process of change is
overwhelmingly an incremental one…Change typically consists of marginal adjustments to the
complex of rules, norms, and enforcement that constitute the institutional framework. The overall
stability of an institutional framework makes complex exchange possible across both time and space.”
(North 1990, p.83) North particularly emphasizes how economies of scope, complementarities, and
network externalities of an institutional matrix make institutional change mostly incremental and path
dependent. Path dependence occurs because the direction of institutional change will be impacted by
the knowledge and skills that the agents have invested in beforehand. Besides following consistent
paths, change will mostly be incremental because disruptive changes would create strong opposition
among the individual agents. Institutions are established to remove uncertainties in individual
interaction and therefore are supposed to provide stability to a certain degree. According to North,
stability is achieved by a set of constraints nested in a hierarchy, where each level is more costly to
change than the previous one.
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4

THE EIC AS AN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND
DERIVATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of this section is to apply institutional economics to the case of the Enterprise Interoperability
Center (EIC) and to derive recommendations for this institutional framework to effectively reduce
uncertainties in electronic interaction between enterprises as well as to sustainably prevail among the
different existing other institutional frameworks.
4.1

The Enterprise Interoperability Center: An Institutional Framework

Can we transfer institutional economic theory to the field of information technology? To review
the major assumptions of new institutionalism as promoted by North: The varying and partly irrational
motivation of individual agents and their inability to comprehensively decipher their environments,
taken together with high transaction costs due to measurement and enforcement costs lead to
uncertainties in the interaction of agents. Institutions emerge which may exist in the form of informal
or formal constraints that need to be enforced to be effective and can be considered as the rules of the
game which agents have to comply with. Agents are assumed to act in a wealth-maximizing fashion
and thereby are impacted by the incentives inherent to the institutional framework. This framework is
changed by individuals or organizations primarily as a consequence of a change in taste or due to
fundamental changes of relative prices, while changes mostly occur incrementally rather than in a
disruptive manner.
The Enterprise Interoperability Centre (EIC) has been launched in April 2006 by the EU project
“ATHENA” under the FP6 Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme which addresses the
key challenges inherent to enterprise interoperability. The major goal of the EIC is to establish,
promote and provide a hub for debate on interoperability issues and to act as a provider of commonly
accepted rule sets for implementing cross-organizational electronic interconnections. Within a five
year time horizon, the EIC is envisioned to become a permanent European hub with a critical mass of
participants that acts as a reference point in enterprise interoperability in both the research and
industry communities. The EIC is characterized by the following major paradigms which are also
considered as key differentiators from existing standardization approaches: It is an open, neutral,
credible and independent entity that encourages participation by all stakeholders in interoperability
without geographic restriction, to both private and public sectors, to legal entities or private persons. It
follows an end-user and consensus-driven approach as it aims at bringing users, solution providers and
standards organizations together in Business Forums to analyze requirements and to define
interoperability requirements for business processes. Finally, Interoperability Profiles will be
developed consisting of consensus-based common processes in combination with selected and
interpreted messaging standards, while using existing standards. EIC Interoperability Profiles also
specify how open message and platform standards should be applied and interpreted to implement
afore defined business processes. Profiles are intended to provide guidance regarding implementation
alternatives like optional data fields or message variants. They are different from standards as they are
devoted to facilitating the adoption and implementation of existing standards rather than inventing a
new one from scratch. Interoperability Profiles sharpen verbal specifications and reduce ambiguities in
the original specifications. Identified weaknesses or gaps are, in turn, reflected back to standards
organizations by providing them with a gap report. The Forums will deliver tools, conformance
testing, analysis, training and other services to facilitate broad adoption in the community. The EIC
can also be considered as living system as it collects the requirements from users, encourages
stakeholders to jointly work on them and produces Interoperability Profiles which are meant to be
adopted by the users again. As opposed to most other entities that tackle interoperability issues, the
EIC does not aim at defining yet another new and supposedly universally valid standard for
implementing cross-organizational business process. Instead, it intends to emerge as and then remain a
hub for continuous discussion that reflects the actual business requirements that its members and
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contributors are facing. The EIC is envisioned to play a mediating role between end-users,
standardization organizations and solution providers: on the one hand, the requirements identified by
industry are supposed to be effectively and comprehensively communicated to standardization entities.
On the other hand, the highly effective validation and implementation of standardization outputs can
be realized by the mediator as well. In this way, the EIC neither acts as a standardization organization
nor a user consortium but as a mediating abstract entity that brings all different stakeholders together.
Figure 3 summarizes the mission the EIC is pursuing: As opposed to conventional standardization
organizations which mostly develop message-oriented, vertical standards and only rarely offer
specifications of collaborative business processes, the EIC facilitates the definition of uniform interorganizational processes and provides guidelines on how to use different existing message formats in
the context of these common business processes.

Figure 3: The EIC standards reference model
As the EIC acts as a reference point for implementation guidelines and support, for the results of
standards testing, training curricula and community building as well as the results of consensus
building processes between the different stakeholders, it can be considered as an institution in a sense
as defined by the new institutionalists such as North. A wide unmanageable variety of standards exist
which lead to huge uncertainty of the potential users: High costs incur for creating proprietary,
bilateral solutions which are not apt for the wide mass of firms. For this reason, users face the
challenge of a high environmental complexity and a limited insight into the most efficient and widely
accepted way to implement cross-organizational electronic interconnections. Uniform rules and
procedures need to be developed and agreed upon to simplify this process and to thus reduce the costs
for interacting. Verbal specifications must be sharpened and ambiguities in original specifications
must be reduced. The consequent institutional framework EIC, by structuring the interaction of
enterprises, limits the choice set of the actors and thus reduces complexity and uncertainty. The EIC
differs from classical organizations as it is an abstract entity that does not act in a wealth-maximizing
fashion while adhering to pre-determined constraints, but rather prescribes formal constraints itself. It
is in this context no new organization, but an institutional framework that provides formal constraints
and thereby impacts the different stakeholders’ activities. The EIC defines the rules of the game, while
users, standardization organizations and governments influence and finally comply with it and in turn
receive information about constraints as depicted above in the form of an information-action loop. All
different stakeholders certainly significantly contribute to these formal constraints and agree on them
in a consensus-driven procedure. The individual players drive the institution, but still comply with the
currently existing rules to minimize transaction costs.
There is a clear need for such an institution which is not solely operated by a government. As
argued above, governments may also act in a mediating fashion, facilitate the adoption of existing

223

standards and coordinate the different SDOs’activities to prevent any kind of collusion (Löwer 2006).
However, governmental organizations act from a central entity’s perspective and do not properly
emphasize the importance of all the stakeholders’ consensus. The EIC regards them as relevant
stakeholders in the establishment and management of constraints and rules, but significantly extends
their role as it pursues a more forum-oriented approach where highly sophisticated and motivated
stakeholders are supposed to agilely agree on and prescribe common guidelines and profiles.
4.2

Recommendations

This section is devoted to presenting recommendations for the EIC as an institution to reduce
uncertainties in electronic interaction of enterprises and to sustainably prevail among the different
existing rule sets. First of all, we elaborate on the essential factors for the EIC to successfully establish
and operate during the next years. Second, we derive implications on how to handle change from
institutions theory as presented above.
As argued by North, people’s “perceptions that the structure of rules of the system is fair and just
reduce costs; equally, their perception that the system is unjust raises the costs of contracting (given
the costliness of measurement and enforcement of contracts).” (North 1990, p. 76). The subjective
perception of fairness of all stakeholders is crucial to facilitate their willingness to actively contribute
and also adhere to the constraints and rules imposed by the EIC. As opposed to large firms, small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have only little financial or human resources available to contribute
to and drive the development of standards, for example. To avoid an overwhelmingly predominant
position of larger corporations and an unfair situation for the smaller stakeholders, all participants
should be provided the same right to vote (independent of the number of involved representatives).
The incorporation of adequate incentives is related to this point as user firms, for example, must
receive significant return from investing in building skills and knowledge within the EIC framework.
In case they do not recognize direct benefits from actively involving and complying with the given
rule set, they might take over a merely observing role or invest into alternative constraint frameworks.
For this reason, the free-riding of user firms who only observe and wait for other players to invest in
the elaboration of a framework that reduces transaction costs is not acceptable and must be accounted
for by the EIC. Only those players should benefit from the advantages of a comprehensive rule set
who commit to further developing it. “The incentives that are built into the institutional framework
play the decisive role in shaping the kinds of skills and knowledge that pay off” (North 1990, p. 78).
The most relevant stakeholders involved in the establishment of standards as defined by Löwer (Löwer
2006), user firms, SDOs, software vendors and governmental organizations all must be provided
proper incentives to actively contribute and also permanently adhere to the EIC institutional
framework. User firms may influence the industry-wide adoption of standards, become first movers by
participating in EIC forums and also benefit from comprehensive access to implementation guidelines
and testing results. As an intermediary between the different stakeholders, the EIC allows SDOs to
integrate users into development efforts and to thus incorporate industry-driven input at an early stage
in order to facilitate the adoption of their products. Software vendors are provided valuable insights
into the different existing SDOs and their respective activities. Due to the participation of user firms
into the forums, vendors have early access to user feedback on the different standards and are enabled
to take this into account earlier than their competitors. Finally, governments may use the EIC as hub
for identifying proper solutions for their own purposes (e.g., public procurement).
Besides the incorporation of fairness and incentives, the actual intent of the stakeholders, their
capabilities and the complexity of the interactions that are governed by the institution represent
central prerequisites for EIC’s success. “How well institutions solve the problems of coordination…is
determined by the motivation of the players (their utility function), the complexity of the environment,
and the ability of the players to decipher and order the environment (measurement and enforcement).”
(North 1990, p.34) For this reason, potential contributors to this institutional framework should be
examined with respect to their motivation and capability to actively engage in the continuous
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development of the rule sets before being admitted. Also, the complexity and scope of the interactions
which are subject to certain constraints should not be overwhelmingly huge. In order to avoid having
too many different industries with their respective requirements comply with one single set of formal
rules, focused councils with possibly different objectives should be established which ensure a feasible
degree of complexity. Users as well as software vendors require pragmatic solutions for their industry
rather than a complex, unmanageable framework that tries to integrate all options that could ever be
relevant for some industry. As argued by Löwer, not only the subjectively perceived benefit of
participating, but also the alignment of the stakeholders’ interests plays a critical role in encouraging
all different stakeholders to contribute to an agreement on or the development of an e-Business
standard. The alignment of an overwhelmingly huge, cross-sectoral group of users, software vendors,
SDOs and governmental organizations may be hard to achieve. For this reason, ensuring the
alignment of focus and objectives of groups of stakeholders represents an essential prerequisite of
EIC’s success.
After providing recommendations on how to emerge as a strong institutional framework that enables
its users to reduce transactions costs, we turn to elaborating on institutional change and which
approach the EIC specifically should follow to sustainably take over a prevailing role. First of all, a
state of institutional equilibrium should be obtained. Interests of stakeholders mostly differ to some
extent. However, as argued above, given the bargaining strength of the stakeholders and the set of
contractual bargains that constitute their interaction, none of them should find it beneficial enough to
spend resources into restructuring the agreements and the underlying institutional framework.
Individual agents will change institutions as soon as this is more profitable than investing in existing
constraints and rule-sets. For this reason, the institution EIC must be flexible to a certain degree to be
able to account for changing external requirements that may emerge as a consequence of new
technologies, for example. The permanent observation of the surrounding relevant standardslandscape as well as other factors which might impact the equilibrium of the different stakeholders’
interests is essential. As stated above, the reduction of complexity represents a key value proposition
of institutions. By taking over the task of comprehensively deciphering the environment, the EIC will
be recognized as an “expert” that provides optimal constraints and rules for the realization of interorganizational electronic business relationships.
On the other hand, the EIC must take care to facilitate incremental, slow changes rather than
permanent, disruptive modifications to ensure stability and the easy exchange between users. If major
changes occur frequently, the motivation for stakeholders to adhere to this institution will be limited as
they have to cope with uncertainty and may even feel wasting the resources which they devoted to
gaining knowledge and skills under the existing set of constraints. “Stability is accomplished by a set
of constraints that include formal rules nested in a hierarchy, where each level is more costly to change
than the previous one.” (North 1990, p.83) As argued by North, there should be a hierarchy of rule sets
of different durability and changeability. In the EIC context, specific semantic annotations that only
concern a limited number of users should be more easily changeable than the design of a central
reference business process which numerous users rely on. Also, in order to avoid frightening off users,
the focus of the Forums (manifested in charters) should not be changed frequently. Participants are
supposed to invest in the working groups’ activities and would feel wasting their resources if basic
agreements are modified frequently. To identify a proper balance between flexibility and reliability of
the resulting institutional framework represents a major challenge.

5

CONCLUSION

In this work, we have motivated the need for a novel approach to facilitating inter-organizational
interoperability. The abundance of different standards, but also the frequently divergent interests of
stakeholders involved in the development and adoption of standards prevents enterprises from
seamlessly interconnecting their applications. Institutional economics provide a sound theoretical
foundation for elaborating on the EIC which acts as a central reference point for user firms, SDOs,
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software vendors as well as governmental organizations with the goal to reduce uncertainty involved
in their mutual interaction. As argued above, the EIC can be considered a hub that provides, among
others, Interoperability Profiles, implementation recommendations and testing results. In this way, it
accelerates the convergence of partly overlapping and vertical standards towards a smaller number of
more widely accepted and sharper specifications. A valid question is whether the institution EIC is still
useful at a point of time when optimal convergence, detailing and adoption of proper standards has
been reached. We agree with institutionalists such as North who promote the enduring need for
institutional frameworks (such as the EIC) since environmental factors always change and must be
accounted for in a proper fashion. Even if all industries have semantically precise, widely accepted
standards available, the EIC plays a beneficial role for all major classes of stakeholders as it is able to
adequately take into account changing technologies, business models, industry preferences, the
potentially varying “tastes” (North 1990) of agents as well as changing relative prices.
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